Pitfalls in vertical arrangements by Rossini, Gianpaolo & Vergari, Cecilia
QPitfalls in 
Gia
C
uaderni - Wo
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vertical arr
 
 
npaolo Ros
ecilia Verga
 
 
rking Pape
 
 
 
 
 
angements
sini 
ri
rs DSE N° 709
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pitfalls in vertical arrangements
Gianpaolo Rossiniyand Cecilia Vergariz
Department of Economics
University of Bologna
Strada Maggiore, 45
I-40125 Bologna Italy
July 6, 2010
Abstract
A popular way of obtaining essential inputs requires the establishment
of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section
of the vertical chain of production by rms competing and selling nal
goods in the downstream (D) section of the vertical chain. In spite of the
apparently simple arrangement there are many possible governances for
the management of the IPJV according to the ownership structure and to
the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent rms. We explore
the best sustainable governance arrangement for the IPJV. We address
this question in a duopoly framwork and we nd a large area of impossible
vertical arrangements associated with technological asymmtery. The most
likely governance of the vertical arrangment associated to the IPJV is total
independence.
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1 Introduction
A popular way of obtaining intermediate goods requires the establishment of an
input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical
chain of production by rms competing and selling goods in the downstream
(D) section of the vertical chain. Many examples may be found in almost all
industries (Hewitt, 2008; Rossini and Vergari, 2010; Chen and Ross, 2003).
Firms jointly build and own a rm which is specialized in the production of an
input sold to the owner rms.
In spite of the apparently simple arrangement there are many possible gov-
ernance structures which may be adopted for the management of the IPJV.The
main di¤erences among them depend on the ownership structure of the IPJV
and on the degree of delegation and/or freedom granted to the IPJV by parent
rms.
A challenging question concerns the best sustainable governance arrange-
ment for the IPJV from a private and a social perspective. However, a crucial
and, may be, hotter question regards the feasibility of most IPJV governance
settings, in particular in the cases in which there are asymmetries between the
parents rms as to production costs in D and ownership stakes in the IPJV. To
this purpose we shall focus also on the cases in which D rms with di¤erent de-
grees of e¢ ciency adopt a specic vertical arrangement, since asymmetric rms
turn out to be quite often unable to give rise to vertical coordinated settings,
making many governances of the IPJV simply not feasible. Indeed, this is main
aim of this paper: to go through the large area of impossible vertical arrange-
ments associated with technological asymmtery, which casts many doubts on
the ability of rms to e¢ ciently jointly manage IPJV.
More precisaly, we develop a simple duopoly framework with linear pricing.1
We investigate both a symmetric and asymmetric framework. We rst consider
the case in which the IPJV is left totally independent of the owners and pursues
its objective, namely it maximizes its own prot obtained in the U section. In
a second case the D rms delegate U to pursue an objective that takes into
account the joint vertical prots, namely its objective consists of both the prot
raised in U and the prot raised by both D rms. Comparing these two cases
and several intermediate settings we wonder whether it is better from the D
rms standpoint to let or not to let the U rm behave independently. We
shall see that the second incentive scheme (i.e., the maximization of the joint
prot) leads to a cartel outcome which is clearly the best solution from the
industry point of view. Nevertheless the governance arrangement underlying
this incentive scheme requires coordination among the D owner rms as they
have to agree on the market strategy of the U rm. If rms are not equal in all
respects, i.e., they show di¤erent degree of e¢ ciency, the two rms may not be
able to coordinate on the input price charged by the U rm they own. Then,
the cartel-clone solution is not possible. A way out of this impossibility could
be a bargaining. Unfortunately, there are large areas of the parameter sets in
1The adoption of linear pricing seems the most realistic approach to vertical pricing as
recent literature points out (Sappington (2005), Arya et al. (2008)).
2
which the bargaining solution does not exist. This occurs mainly when the two
rms are di¤erent but own the U in equal shares. If the two rms have di¤erent
e¤ciency levels and di¤erent stakes in the IPJV, for instance proportional to
their relative e¢ ciency, a the bargaining solution may exist.
A general available way out of impossibility dead ends is delegation. How-
ever, when deciding about delegating U, the D rms face a trade-o¤. The more
the U rm is independent of the D rms, the higher the negative externality
that it imposes on the D rms and the lower the joint prots. The lower the
degree of delegation granted to the U rm, the higher the joint prot obtained
in U (that in the limit corresponds to the monopoly prot) but the lower the
probability of reaching an agreement about the U strategy. As we shall see, this
trade-o¤ points to the existence of an optimal degree of delegation. We shall
then see that the most likely governance of the vertical arrangment associated
to the IPJV is total independence, leaving aside most of remaing alternative
governance schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section (2) we describe the model. We
rst study a symmetric framework, where rms are equal in all respects and
may have the incentive to choose an intermediate degree of delegation to grant
to the U producer they own. We then investigate an asymmetric framework
where rms di¤er in their e¢ ciency levels. This is the case where impossibility
results are more likely to arise. We conclude in Section (3).
2 Model
We consider a Cournot duopoly model with 2 rms producing a di¤erentiated
output, qi sold at the unit price pi and variable production costs equal to ciqi.
The demand system is given by linear inverse schedules pi = a  qi   bqj in the
region of quantities where prices are positive. The parameter a > 0 represents
market size; b 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability between the nal
products (if b = 1, products are perfect substitutes; if b = 0, products are
specialized, i.e., perfectly di¤erentiated).
Manufacturing a nal good requires an essential input produced by an up-
stream (U) enterprise owned either in equal or in di¤erent stakes by the down-
stream (D) rms (Input Production Joint Venture - IPJV). More precisely, the
D rms may set up an Equity Joint Venture (Hewitt, 2008) whose prots accrue
ultimately to the D rms themselves, making for their consolidated prots.
As it is customary in the literature on vertical relationships we assume that
one unit of input is embodied in each unit of output (perfect vertical comple-
mentarity). Input production requires a xed commitment equal to f  0.
A two stage game is developed where the two rms rst (possibly) agree on
the price of the essential input and then compete in the D market. The D rms
consolidated prots read as follows:
iD = (pi   ci   w) qi + si [w(qi + qj)  f ] ; i = 1; 2 and i 6= j, (1)
where w is the input price set in the rst stage if an agreement among the D
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rms is reached; si 2 (0; 1) is the share of the U IPJV owned by rm i, si = 1=2
means that U rm is owned in equal stakes by Ds. The consolidated prots are
then made up of two parts. The rst (pi   ci   w) qi is the own prot gained
in the D section by each D rm. The second si [w(qi + qj)] is the share of
prot gained in the U section. Proceeding backwards in the second stage, prot
maximization by the D rms gives rise to the equilibrium quantities and prices
which depend on w; in the rst stage the input price w is chosen. The input
price is a crucial variable which "lters" the externality a¤ecting many vertical
relationships. In our model w is set by the IPJV and the setting rule depends
on the degree of delegation that the D rms decide to grant.
2.1 Symmetric framework
We rst analyse the case of symmetric technology and for the sake of simplicity
we assume ci = cj = 0. This also let us reasonably set si = sj = 1=2.
2.1.1 Minimal and maximal delegation
Consider rst the case in which the U rm completely complies with the D
guidelines (hence, the degree of delegation granted to the U rm is zero, minimal
delegation). Each rm rst chooses its preferred input price wi and then the
output qi maximising iD dened in (1). This scenario has been analysed by
Chen and Ross (2003) that conne the analysis to the case of perfect symmetry.
The equilibrium variables are:
w =
ab
1 + b
;
pM =
a
2
; (2)
qM =
a
2 (1 + b)
; (3)
iD =
a2
4 (1 + b)
;
and industry prots are:
M =
a2
2 (1 + b)
  f: (4)
This equilibrium is equivalent to the horizontal merger between the two D rms,
which decide to produce in-house (vertical integration) the essential input and
set the monopoly price downstream. Unfortunately this governance arrange-
ment su¤ers a drawback which raises a feasibility issue. An agreement between
the two D rms as to the input price is reached if and only if wi = wj = w. It
is easily shown that the two rms would like to charge di¤erent prices for the
input when, in general, they are not equal, i.e., for example ci 6= cj . In other
words the degree of disagreement depends directly upon the di¤erence in their
cost structure, i.e., the degree of asymmetry.
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Independently of rms asymmetries, any coordination problem as to the
input price can be xed in the case of complete delegation when the D rms let
the IPJV decide on the input price in a totally autonomous way (the degree of
delegation granted to the U rm is one, maximal delegation). Formally, rst,
the input price is chosen by the IPJV maximising its own objective function:
U = w (qi + qj)  f: (5)
In the second stage we face two alternative routes: the D rms compete in the
downstream market maximising either their consolidated prot or their opera-
tive prot. We rst consider the former alternative where the D rms maximize
iD dened in (1). The equilibrium variables are:
w = a (6)
pi =
a (3 + b)
2 (2 + b)
; (7)
qi =
a
2 (b+ 2)
;
iD =
a2 (b+ 3)
4 (b+ 2)
2 (8)
 =
a2 (3 + b)
2 (b+ 2)
2 (9)
It is easily shown that the operative prot in D, i.e., (pi   w) qi is negative as the
input price set by U is too large. This is a rst impossibility result that we shall
generalize in the asymmetric framework (Section 2.2). If we consider the latter
alternative for the second stage, i.e., maximization of Dsoperative prots rather
than the consolidated ones, the same equilibrium price, quantity and industry
prot arise; however, the equilibrium input price is at the monopoly level, i.e.,
wM = a=2 and the distribution of prots along the vertical chain is such that
both the operative prot in D and U are nonnegative.2
After having compared the two extreme cases, we realize that under com-
plete delegation there is no coordination problem as to the input price to be
charged by U. On one hand complete delegation is good since it is feasible. On
the other hand, the market equilibrium turns out to be worse than the cartel
case (delegation = 0) from both a social and a private point of view (indeed
comparing equilibrium price and industry prot we nd that pM dened in (2)
is lower than pi dened in (7), and M dened in (4) is lower than  dened
in (9)).
2.1.2 Optimal degree of delegation
Given the above results in the two extreme cases of total and no delegation
we may wonder whether there exists a level of delegation which is feasible and
2For details see Rossini and Vergari (2010) where we investigate IPJV in the symmetric
case.
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sustainable as an equilibrium, not coincident with neither of the two extremes,
the cartel case and total delegation.
To this purpose we introduce uncertainty about the possibility to reach an
agreement on the U strategy and assume that the D owner rms strategically
decide the degree of delegation to grant to U, d 2 [0; 1]. More precisely, we
consider a situation where the U objective function is:
u = dw [q1 + q2] + (1  d) [w (q1 + q2) + (p1   w) q1 + (p2   w) q2] ; (10)
where d 2 (0; 1) represents delegation parameter, i.e., the incentive struc-
ture that the D owner rms determine for the managers governing the IPJV.3
Namely, the objective function of the U producer depends on the degree of del-
egation granted, d 2 [0; 1]: if d = 1, the IPJV is completely autonomous; if
d = 0, the IPJV complies with the D guidelines; if d 2 (0; 1) its objective is
somewhere in between the two extreme cases.
With this aim, we develop the following three stage game. First, the D rms
choose d; second, the IPJV in U sets w; nally, the D rms compete in the D
market.
The objective function of each D rm is the operative prot raised in D plus
the share of operative U prot if they reach an agreement on the U strategy; it
is the sheer operative D prot otherwise. The objective function of the D rms
is thus stochastic as it depends on the exogenous probability,  2 [0; 1], to reach
an agreement on the U strategy. Formally, the expected operative prot is:
E(iD) =  [(pi   w) qi + (1=2)w (qi + qj)] + (1  ) (pi   a=2) qi:
Note that if an agreement on w is not reached the IPJV ends up behaving in an
independent fashion.4 In this case, we would have a monopoly in U with input
price equal to wM = a=2 and a duopoly in D.
Proceeding backwards, the third stage maximization problem leads to the
following quantity and price which depend on the variable w and on the para-
meters,  and b:
qi [w(d); ; b] =
a+  (a  w)
2 (b+ 2)
pi [w(d); ; b] =
3a+ ab+  (w   a) (b+ 1)
2 (b+ 2)
If  = 0, the game is over, the remaining two stages are not feasible as the IPJV
will not be set up. In this case, we have a U monopoly and a D duopoly, with
equilibrium quantities qi ( = 0) = a=(2(2 + b). Therefore, the following results
hold for  2 (0; 1].
3As studied by Fershtam and Judd (1987), in oligopoly prot maximizing owners may give
their managers incentives di¤erent from prot maximization.
4The market equilibrium is the same as the case in which the non-agreement situation
occurs with maximum delegation and IPJV.
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The second stage maximization problem results in the following input price:
w (d; ; b) =
a

 ( + b   1) + d  b+ 3 + b   2   b2 + 2
 [ (b+ 1) + d (2b     b + 4)] :
The D rm expected prot thus becomes
E(iD) =

d
 
3  2 + 3   b2 + b + b+ 2 (b+ 1) (d+ ) a2
4 (d   2bd     b   4d+ bd)2
and the maximization with respect to d results in the following optimal degree
of delegation:
d (; b) =
 (b+ 1) (1  )  2 + b + 3   b2 + 2 2 [0; 1):
As expected, when  = 1, that is the D rms reach an agreement with certainty,
the optimal degree of delegation is d = 0, i.e., the D rms obtain the cartel
outcome. Since  > 0, there is always a positive probability to reach an agree-
ment. In other words, d = 1 is never an equilibrium. Comparative statics with
respect to  and b allow us to write the following.
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal degree of delegation, d (; b), which is
a non linear function of the probability to reach an agreement between the D
rms and is growing in the degree of product substitutability.
Proof. See Appendix.
Discussion. An optimal degree of delegation exists; it grows for low levels
of the probability to reach an agreement and it decreases for high levels of this
probability. This means that when the likelihood of the agreement is growing
but low, rms tend to increase the level of delegation and prefer to make the
IPJV more accountable (the incentive to delegate is larger than the incentive
to provide guidelines to the U rm to get cartel prots). When the agreement
becomes almost sure, the rms tend to impose to the IPJV their policies (the
incentive to delegate becomes lower since the higher probability of reaching
an agreement makes the cartel solution a quite safe arrangement). A more
interesting feature is the one concerning the degree of competition in D embodied
in the level of b: the tougher the competition in D, the higher the delegation
that rms are willing to grant. As product market competition goes up the
prot-reservoir role of the IPJV is back and becomes the main engine behind
the degree of delegation.
2.2 Asymmetric framework
As pointed out in the introduction, the generalization of the analysis of vertical
arrangements associated to the IPJV requires the investigation of cases in which
the D parent rms di¤er. As we shall see it is in these cases that most of the
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impossibility outcomes appear. Then, we turn to these cases trying to provide
some way out of impossibility results.
We assume that rmsmarginal costs are c1   c2 > 0. For the sake of
simplicity we set c2 = 0. Thus, c1 2 [0; 1] measures the cost di¤erence among
the two rms. Note that when the D owner rms show specic e¢ ciency levels,
they may di¤er also in the ownership shares of the IPJV. Assume, for instance,
that ownership shares depend upon cost asymmetry in the following way: s1 =
(1  c1) =2 and s2 = (1 + c1) =2. The consolidated prot are then:
1D = (p1   c1   w) q1 + 1  c1
2
[w(q1 + q2)  f ] ; (11)
2D = (p2   w) q2 + 1 + c1
2
[w(q1 + q2)  f ] : (12)
In words, the most e¢ cient rm, which is presumably the largest one, gets a
higher share of U prot.
2.2.1 Bargaining on the input price
Due to the results pointed out in the symmetric framework, we wonder whether
we may think of a bargaining process on the input price w as a way out of
the kind of impossibility" arising in the cartel case when the two D rms are
not equal, so they have di¤erent preferred input prices. We think of D rms
bargaining over the input price to be set by the IPJV. The bargaining will
substitute a stage of the game played by the two D rms.
In the rst stage rms choose the input price through a bargaining process.5
The predicted input price is given by:
w = argmax[1D   duopoly1 ] [2D   duopoly2 ]1  ,
where 1D and 2D are dened either by (1) with si = 1=2, or by (11) and (12);
duopolyi represents rm is outside option (with i = 1; 2) which is the equilibrium
outcome of an asymmetric duopoly downstream and an independent monopoly
upstream;  = 1 c12 is rm 1s baldness consistent with a larger bargaining
power by the most e¢ cient rm (rm 2). In the second market stage rms
compete in quantities. Solving backwards this two-stage game, we can prove
the following.
Proposition 2 When rms di¤er in their e¢ ciency levels, i) they are not able
to reach an agreement upon the input price if they own the U producer in equal
shares; ii) an agreement can be reached instead if the D rms own U in asym-
metric shares.
5We model the outcomes of the bargaining via the formula of an asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution which is interpreted as the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model when the lag between o¤ers converges to zero (see Bin-
more et al., 1986).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Discussion This result may be tought to reect commonly observed organi-
zation and practical wisdom. If two rms give rise to any kind of joint venture it
is quite unlikely that they may accept equal stakes if they enjoy di¤erent degrees
of e¢ ciency. The lowest cost rm, which is quite often the largest company, will
certainly require a stronger voice in the executive board of the IPJV. In the ab-
sence of an asymmetric governance the bargaining will be deemed to failure. In
the presence of an asymmetric governance the bargaining process may succed.
2.2.2 Degree of delegation
Let us consider again delegation now in the asymmetric case. Is there an optimal
level of delegation? To answer this question we introduce a more interesting
setting where the probability of reaching an agreement is no longer exogeneous
but it is a function of the cost di¤erence, i.e.,  (c1; c2) = 1   (c1   c2) with
c2 = 0. Thus, the probability to reach an agreement decreases with c1 and it is
equal to 1 in the symmetric case, c1 = 0.
The game structure remains as in Subsection (1). Then, we have a three-
stage game where, in the third stage we get the D quantities as a function of
w, in the second stage we obtain w as a function of the degree of delegation d,
and in the rst stage (choice of d), we solve the coordination problem over the
governance of the IPJV. As one may guess, in this new asymmetric framework,
rms prefer di¤erent degrees of delegation, in particular d1 > d2. The most
e¢ cient rm would choose a lower degree of delegation which in turn results in
a lower input price and a more e¢ cient market outcome. An agreement on d
is not easily attainable. For instance, a bargaining on d leads to results close
to those drawn for the bargaining on w. This further result let us write the
following.
Proposition 3 Only complete delegation (d = 1) allows to solve any coordina-
tion problem in the asymmetric framework.
Proof. The proof is a kind of clone of the Proposition 2 and we do not report
it.6
In this case the IPJV objective function is simply U = w (q1 + q2). The
equilibrium results are proposed in following subsections in the two cases of
symmetric and asymmetric shares in the IPJV.
Symmetric shares In this case, the D owner rms objective function is
dened by (1) with si = sj = 1=2. The second stage quantity competition leads
to the following quantities:
q1 (w) =
(2a  w) (2  b)  4c1
2 (b+ 2) (2  b)
q2 (w) =
(2a  w) (2  b) + 2bc1
2 (b+ 2) (2  b) :
6We make it available only for interested readers.
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The rst stage input price set by the IPJV is
w = a  c1
2
:
It is easy to show that with this input price the operative prots of the least
e¢ cient rm are always negative since the input price is too large and U ex-
tracts too much prot from the D parent rms. Then, we end up with a new
impossibility.
Consider now the same two-stage game. Yet D rms maximize their opera-
tive prots rather than the consolidated ones. Formally:
qi (w) = argmax
qi
(pi   ci   w) qi:
Second stage equilibrium quantities are:
q1 (w) =
(a  w) (2  b)  2c1
(b+ 2) (2  b) ;
q2 (w) =
(a  w) (2  b) + bc1
(b+ 2) (2  b) :
The rst stage equilibrium input price is
w =
2a  c1
4
:
Equilibrium quantities, prices and prots are:
q1 =
(2ab  4a+ 6c1 + bc1)
4 (b+ 2) (b  2)
q2 =
(4a  2ab+ 2c1 + 3bc1)
4 (b+ 2) (2  b)
U =
( 2a+ c1)2
8(2 + b)
1D =
(2ab  4a+ 6c1 + bc1)2
16 (b+ 2)
2
(b  2)2
2D =
(4a  2ab+ 2c1 + 3bc1)2
16 (b+ 2)
2
(b  2)2 :
Asymmetric shares Here we assume asymmetric stakes, with the larger
stake for the most e¢ cient rm. Namely, consider the consolidated prots de-
ned by (11) and (12). Second stage quantity competition leads to the following
quantities:
q1 (w) =
(2a  w) (b  2) + c1 (2w + bw + 4)
2 (b+ 2) (b  2)
q2 (w) =
(2a  w) (2  b) + c1 (2b+ 2w + bw)
2 (b+ 2) (2  b) :
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The rst stage input price set by the IPJV under complete delegation is
w = a  c1
2
We get the same result as in the symmetric shares case and we end up with
another impossibility. Turning again to a quantity competition such that the D
rms maximize their operative prots rather than their consolidated prots the
equilibrium outcome is the same as in the symmetric shares case.
These results are summarized in the ensuing Proposition and in the subse-
quent discussion.
Proposition 4 When the D rms show di¤erent (or equal) e¢ ciency levels
and own the IPJV in proportions which are directly proportional to their rela-
tive e¢ ciency levels, the maximization of consolidated prots gives rise to an
impossibility result since at least the ine¢ cient rm always faces negative oper-
ative prots.
Discussion As it appears the only possible solution is one in which the D
rms maximize their operative prots, this holds for both the symmetric and
the asymmetric framework. In this case the rules adopted for the sharing of
the IPJV prots may change the preference of the least e¢ cient rm vis à vis
the rival, but it is not going to make the equilibrium variables undergo any
variation.
3 Conclusions
In our investigation of the governance of an IPJV we came across several im-
possibility results. Most of them arise in the more general cases of asymmetric
cost structure, which may hint di¤erent rm sizes. The bulk of impossibility
outcomes makes an independent IPJV the most likely setting. Indeed the IPJV
with maximum delegation seems to be the most viable and likely governance so-
lution which turns out to be adopted even in asymmetric circumstances. Firms
may decide to bargain over the input price. In this case they reduce drastically
the extent of delegation. Here, a solution is possible if the IPJV has an owner-
ship structure which reects the di¤erent degrees of e¢ ciency of the two parent
rms in D.
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Partial derivatives of the optimal degree of delegation are such that:
@
@
d (; b) > 0 ()  2 (0; 0:414) ;
@
@b
d (; b) > 0, always.
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4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
i) Maximising the consolidated prots dened in (1) with si = 1=2, we get the
following second stage equilibrium quantities and prots:
q1 =
(2a  w) (2  b)  4c1
2 (b+ 2) (2  b) > 0 () c1 <
(2a  w) (2  b)
4
q2 =
(2a  w) (2  b) + 2bc1
2 (b+ 2) (2  b)
1d =
16c21+2c1(2 b)(4w 8a+2bw+b2w)+(b 2)2(2a w)(2a+w+bw)
4(b+2)2(b 2)2
2d =
4b2c21+8c1(2 b)(ab w bw)+(b 2)2(2a w)(2a+w+bw)
4(b+2)2(b 2)2
The outside option is an asymmetric D duopoly and an U monopoly:
wM =
(2a  c1)
4
qduopoly1 =
(2ab  4a+ 6c1 + bc1)
4 (b+ 2) (b  2) > 0 () c1 <
4a  2ab
(6 + b)
duopoly1 =
(2a( 2 + b) + (6 + b)c1)2
16( 4 + b2)2
duopoly2 =
( 2a( 2 + b) + (2 + 3b)c1)2
16( 4 + b2)2
Computing the di¤erence iD duopolyi we check whether (and for which values
of w), both rms prefer the IPJV with respect to the outside option. We
consider the case of homogeneous goods, i.e., b = 1 so that the constraint
for the non-negativity of qduopoly1 becomes c1 < 2a=7 and the constraint for the
non-negativity of q1 becomes c1 <
(2a w)
4 . We restrict our attention to this
case to simplify computations, moreover in this case we eliminate a source of
heterogeneity among rms, therefore if an agreement is not reached under b = 1,
we conclude that a fortiori it is not reached for b 2 [0; 1).
1d   duopoly1 = 3(c1 2a)(5c1 2a) 8w
2+w(8a+56c10)
144 > 0 () w 2 (w1; w2) ;
where w2 = 12

a+ 7c1 +
1
2
p
2
p
14a2   8ac1 + 113c21

> 0, and w1 = 12 (a+ 7c1) 
1
4
p
2
p
14a2   8ac1 + 113c21 < 0 given the constraint c1 < 27a for the non-
negativity of qduopoly1 .
2d   duopoly2 =   8w
2+w(64c1 8a)+3(c1 2a)(2a+3c1)
144 > 0 () w 2 (w3; w4) ;
where w3 = 12a   4c1   14
p
2
p
14a2   20ac1 + 119c21 and w4 = 12a   4c1 +
1
4
p
2
p
14a2   20ac1 + 119c21. w3 > 0 () 12a 4c1 > 14
p
2
p
14a2   20ac1 + 119c21.
If 12a   4c1 > 0 () a8 > c1, then w3 > 0 () (c1   2a) > 0, never.
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If 12a   4c1 < 0, then w3 < 0. We conclude that w3 < 0. w4 > 0 () 
1
2a  4c1

+ 14
p
2
p
14a2   20ac1 + 119c21 > 0, always if a8 > c1, else, w4 >
0 ()    38 (c1   2a) (2a+ 3c1) > 0, always. We conclude that w4 > 0. w2  
w4 > 0 () 11c1 + 12
p
2
p
14a2   8ac1 + 113c21 > 14
p
2
p
14a2   20ac1 + 119c21
always. The range of w such that both 1d duopoly1 > 0 and 2d duopoly2 > 0
is w 2 (0; w4) which is a non-empty interval as shown above. We next compute
w = argmax[1D   duopoly1 ]
1 c1
2 [2D   duopoly2 ]
1+c1
2
and nd that w > w4 and w ! w4 as c1 ! 0, that is the symmetric case.
ii) Consider now the case in which each rm owns a share of the U producer
which is proportional to its e¢ ciency:
1D = (p1   c1   w) q1 + 1  c1
2
w (q1 + q2)
2D = (p2   w) q2 + 1 + c1
2
w (q1 + q2)
Second stage equilibrium quantities and prots (a stands for asymmetric shares)
are then
qa2 =
(2a  w) (2  b) + c1 (2b+ 2w + bw)
2 (b+ 2) (2  b)
qa1 =
(2a  w) (2  b)  c1 (2w + bw + 4)
2 (b+ 2) (2  b) > 0 () c1 <
(2a  w) (2  b)
(2w + bw + 4)
a1D =
c21A+2c1(2 b)B+C
4(b+2)2(b 2)2 and 
a
2D =
c21D+2c1(b 2)E+F
4(b+2)2(b 2)2 ,
whereA = b3w (w + 2)+3b2w2 4  w2   4w   4, B = b2w (1 + a)+bw (3w   2a+ 2)+
2
 
2w   4a  4aw + 3w2, C = (b  2)2 (2a  w) (2a+ w + bw), D = b3w2 +
b2 (w + 2) (3w + 2) + 4w (2b  w   4), E = ab2w + b  4w   4a  2aw + 3w2  
2w (4a  3w   2) and F = (b  2)2 (2a  w) (2a+ w + bw). Again we con-
sider a particular case to simplify computations: suppose b = 1. Then, qa1 >
0 () c1 < (2a w)(3w+4) and qduopoly1 > 0 () c1 < 27a with (2a w)(3w+4)  
2
7a =   (7w 6a+6aw)7(3w+4) > 0 () w < 6a(6a+7) . For rm 1 to stay in the
market in both cases we need c1 < min
n
(2a w)
(3w+4) ;
2
7a
o
. Suppose also c1 =
a
10 . 
a
1D   duopoly1 =
w2(720a 800)+w(1360a 648a2)+855a2
14 400 > 0 for a > 1:24 be-
cause the root w =

4a(81a 170) 4
p
a2(6561a2 66 015a+71 650)

720a 800 is not real. 
a
2D  
duopoly2 =  w
2(720a+800) wa(160+720a) 1311a2
14 400 > 0 () w2 (720a+ 800) +
w
  160a  720a2 1311a2 < 0. The numerator is zero in w = 80a+360a2 4p5pa2(12 519a+1620a2+13 190)720a+800 <
0. We conclude that a2D   duopoly2 > 0 always. Thus, there are ranges of the
parameters where the IPJV is preferred to the outside option for any w and so
also for w.
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